



SHIFTING THE SYSTEM: THE JOURNEY TOWARDS HUMANITARIAN REFORM IN INDONESIA | MAY 2021

This report is part of Humanitarian Advisory Group's *Blueprint for Change* research project.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Research team: Jesse McCommon and Eleanor Davey, Humanitarian Advisory Group; Henny Vidiarina and Puji Pujiono, Pujiono Centre

Lead Author: Jesse McCommon

Humanitarian Editor: Eleanor Davey

Copy Editor: Campbell Aitken

Graphic Designer: Jean Watson

Cover Photo: Landscape of Batur volcano on Bali island, Indonesia. oOhyperblaster / Shutterstock

Humanitarian Advisory Group would like to thank those who contributed to this paper, including Yos Malole, Theresia Wuryantari and Kharisma Priyo Nugroho who provided peer review as well as our Building a Blueprint for Change Steering Committee, who provided additional feedback and technical input.

This report is a part of Humanitarian Advisory Group's Building a Blueprint for Change research, which is being conducted in partnership with the Pujiono Centre. This research is part of the Humanitarian Horizons Research Program 2018-21, funded by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

INTRODUCING THE RESEARCH

Building a Blueprint for Change

Building a Blueprint for Change is a two-year research stream under Humanitarian Advisory Group's Humanitarian Horizons research initiative. It aims to provide an evidence base to progress transformative change in the humanitarian system at the country level.

Humanitarian Horizons

Humanitarian Horizons is a three-year research initiative implemented by Humanitarian Advisory Group. The program adds unique value to humanitarian action in Asian and Pacific contexts by generating evidence-based research and creating conversations for change. The program is supported by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

WHO WE ARE

Humanitarian Advisory Group

Humanitarian Advisory Group (HAG) was founded in 2012 to elevate the profile of humanitarian action in Asia and the Pacific. Set up as a social enterprise, HAG provides a unique space for thinking, research, technical advice and training that contributes to excellence in humanitarian practice. As an ethically driven business, we combine humanitarian passion with entrepreneurial agility to think and do things differently.

We believe we cannot provide research or technical support in countries without the support and guidance of national consultants. Our experience is that national consultants improve the quality of our work by ensuring that we focus on the most relevant issues, providing contextual understanding to our projects, and enabling linkages into national and regional networks. We seek to engage national consultants for all our projects that involve in-country work; for us, this is both a principle and a standard way of working.

Pujiono Centre

Pujiono Centre's mission is to build effective multidisciplinary and intersectional knowledge by expanding the capacities of practitioners and learners via innovation, tools and services. The Pujiono Centre promotes evidence-based policymaking in disaster management and climate risk reduction through the provision of credible information.

Certified



Humanitarian Advisory Group is BCorp certified. This little logo means we work hard to ensure that our business is a force for good. We have chosen to hold ourselves accountable to the highest social, environmental and ethical standards, setting ourselves apart from business as usual.

CONTENTS

I. Introduction	5
2. The 2004 tsunami and resulting reforms	9
2.1. 2004 tsunami response	9
2.2. Implications for reform in Indonesia	12
2.3. 2007 disaster management reform	13
2.4. Consolidation of reforms 2007-2016	14
3. Changes in the regional and global framework	18
3.1. International actors in Indonesia	18
3.2. Regional initiatives	19
3.3. Global initiatives	20
4. The push for localisation	23
4.1. 2018 Central Sulawesi response	23
4.2. Implications of the Central Sulawesi response	25
4.3. The COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia	27
4.4. COVID-19 and humanitarian response	28
5. Conclusion	30
References	33
Abbreviations and acronyms	37



Jakarta, Indonesia - November 27, 2009: Street food sellers preparing to sell outside Chinese temple complex in petak Sembilan. Ryan Wijaya Tan / Shutterstock

1. INTRODUCTION

This report explores the evolution of the humanitarian system in Indonesia. It examines key events and turning points in the country's progression towards locally led disaster management and humanitarian action. It identifies previous barriers and enablers to change, arguing that future humanitarian reform efforts in Indonesia will need to reach beyond national structures to include and strengthen systems and actors at sub-national levels (which are referred to in this report as 'local'). The COVID-19 pandemic has elevated the role of local actors, including grassroots organisations not necessarily identified with the humanitarian sector, and revealed the urgent need to invest in the frontlines, in Indonesia and globally.

This report reviews national and international responses to major disasters in Indonesia over the past 20 years, examining the impact of global and regional developments alongside national reform and demonstrating the increasing role and increasing need of local actors.

It will inform the next steps of Humanitarian Advisory Group's **Building a Blueprint for Change** research program, which seeks to identify success factors for transformative change to the humanitarian system in Indonesia. The report adopts a historical lens to interrogate previous challenges and opportunities for reform in order to hypothesise the most effective strategies for future efforts.

This review builds on and tests findings from Phase 1 of the Blueprint project, which mapped the humanitarian system in Indonesia and identified priority areas for reform. The first phase of the Blueprint research included three stakeholder workshops held in Jakarta to understand the current state of the system in Indonesia.¹ **Stakeholders across various levels, including local, national and international actors, agreed on four core focus areas for the research: coordination, accountability, funding and capacity development.** This literature review prioritises analysis of these areas, including their evolution, persisting challenges and opportunities for intervention.

¹ For more information about Blueprint Phase 1, please see HAG's [Building a Blueprint for Change: Laying the Foundations](#), 2020.

Methodology and terminology

Information for this review was gathered from secondary sources, including academic publications and grey literature such as research reports, response evaluations, humanitarian response plans, situation reports, government legislation and national, regional and global policy frameworks, supplemented by news articles, blogs and findings from Blueprint Phase 1. Analysis involved the comparison of disaster responses, lessons learned and resulting government reform, tracked alongside regional and global influences.

The review recognises the concentration of literature around the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2018 Central Sulawesi response. These events are highlighted as the key change points in the evolution of the system and serve to anchor the narrative of reform. Other disasters examined include those which attracted international resources, focusing on sudden-onset disasters due to their links with reform efforts. It was beyond the scope of this report to explore the many national responses within this time period or to provide detailed policy analysis of subsequent government regulation. Rather, it focuses on high-level analysis of changes and their implications.

While the report refers to the 'humanitarian system' to reflect the integration of multiple types of actors in emergency response, it does not aim to analyse conflict settings and responses in detail, because there are few examples of institutionalised reform processes to draw upon in these areas, particularly from the past 20 years. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Indonesia's 2007 Disaster Management Reform Law includes an expansive definition of disasters (article 1.1) as 'an event or a series of events threatening and disturbing the community life and livelihood, caused by natural and/or nonnatural as well as human factors resulting in human fatalities, environmental damage, loss of material possessions, and psychological impact'. Further, it defines a 'social disaster' (article 1.4) as 'an event or a series of events caused by humans, which include social conflicts between community groups, and terrorism'.

Structure

Section II below examines the response to and implications of the 2004 tsunami and subsequent major disaster management reform. Section III situates these developments within the wider context of global and regional reform. Section IV explores more recent changes, emphasising the prominent role of Indonesia's national government and local actors by investigating recent responses to the Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami as well as the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic. Key events and processes covered in this analysis are summarised in the timeline below. The report concludes (section V) with a discussion of barriers and enablers and a brief analysis of potential entry points for future reform.

Timeline

Date	Disaster	Global and regional developments	Indonesia developments
2001			Humanitarian Response Fund established in Indonesia
2003		Humanitarian Accountability Partnership established Good Humanitarian Donorship principles endorsed	Indonesian Society for Disaster Management established Civil society begins building momentum for disaster management reform
2004	 Indian Ocean tsunami	Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) project founded Sphere Standards revised	
2005	 Nias earthquake	Ten-year Hyogo Framework is adopted Humanitarian Reform Process begins; clusters activated for first time in Pakistan Regional: First Asia Pacific Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (APMCDRR) is held in Beijing	ECB project launched in Indonesia. Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (BRR) established; disaster management focus shifts from relief to recovery
2006	 Central Java (Yogyakarta) earthquake  Pangandaran earthquake	Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) launched	Cluster approach used for first time in Indonesia (second time globally) in response to Yogyakarta earthquake National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (2006-2009) launched
2007	 West Sumatra earthquake	First Global Platform for DRR is launched Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction is established	Passing of Disaster Management Law 24/2007 Disaster mitigation and management identified as one of the core priorities for national development for 2008
2008		Regional: Cyclone Nargis – ASEAN is central to response	Establishment of Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) and Provincial and District agencies (BPBDs)
2009	 West Java earthquake  West Sumatra earthquake	Regional: ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) ratified	Major increase in national budget to DRR National Platform for DRR (PLANAS PRB) established


Date	Disaster	Global and regional developments	Indonesia developments
2010	 Mentawai earthquake & tsunami and Mt Merapi eruption		BNPB passes regulation on the role of international organisations during emergency response and embraces international cluster system
2011		Transformative Agenda agreed upon Regional: AHA Centre established	
2012		IASC Task Force on Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) is created	Indonesia hosts APMCDRR in Yogyakarta
2014		Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) is launched	Formal national cluster system established with government leads
2015		Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction adopted	
2016	 Pidie Jaya earthquake	World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) held; Grand Bargain launched Regional: One ASEAN One Response adopted	Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) Indonesia commissions first Lessons Learned report Increased attention on coordination leads to development of new National Disaster Response Framework (NDRF)
2017	 Mt Agung eruption		
2018	 Lombok earthquake  Central Sulawesi earthquake & tsunami	Regional: ASEAN takes a leadership role in coordination of Sulawesi response	NDRF launched but not operationalised BNPB passes regulation limiting international access to disaster sites Emphasis on collective accountability approach in Sulawesi
2020	 COVID-19	No international surge support All programming through local partners Funding constraints	Revision of Disaster Management Law in process
2021	 West Sulawesi earthquake		

2. THE 2004 TSUNAMI AND RESULTING REFORMS

Significant changes have occurred in the global humanitarian system over the past two decades. Many global reforms can be traced back to the massive international response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which affected more than a dozen countries and claimed the lives of 230,000 people. This led to a period of reflection

for the humanitarian sector and catalysed the official Humanitarian Reform Process in 2005. For Indonesia, this disaster response marked a turning point for relationships between the national government and the international community during emergencies.

2.1 2004 TSUNAMI RESPONSE



The December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was an exceptional event, due to both the scale of the damage and the scale of the response. Indonesia was among the countries worst affected, with Aceh province completely devastated. More than 140,000 homes were destroyed and over 600,000 people are reported to have lost their livelihoods (BRR and World Bank, 2005). This

destruction occurred alongside ongoing conflict in Aceh between the Government of Indonesia (GOI) and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka - GAM).²

In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, communities led search and rescue and lifesaving activities. In Indonesia, 91% of those interviewed

² On humanitarian action and the conflict in Aceh, see: Aguswandi (2005). *Breaking the Deadlock: Civil Society Engagement for Conflict Resolution*. In *Aceh under Martial Law: Conflict, Violence and Displacement*. E.-L. E. Hedman. Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre: 45-55; Drexler, E. (2006). *Provoking Separatism, Authenticating Violence: Aceh's Humanitarian Pause*. *Violent Conflicts in Indonesia*. C. A. Coppel. London, Routledge: 163-173.

by the Fritz Institute (2005) reported that they had been rescued by private individuals. Nearly 4% of the population of Aceh province was killed in the tsunami, including an estimated 60 senior leaders of civil society and more than 5,200 staff from local authorities (Scheper, Parakrama and Patel, 2006). This breakdown of local government leadership essentially left affected communities to respond autonomously, aided by the Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia - TNI), until the GOI officially requested foreign assistance and allowed international access to Aceh the following day.

TNI has historically maintained a prominent role in disaster response in Indonesia. The role of TNI has fluctuated over the years depending on several factors, including the national climate of democracy at the time of response, the depth of the crisis at hand and the readiness of the civilian government (ACMC, HAG, OCHA and AHA Centre, 2020). In Aceh, under the pressure of such a catastrophic disaster and amongst the collapse of local government, TNI played a dominant role in response, working closely with the GOI.

The GOI activated the ad hoc National Disaster Management Coordinating Board (Bakornas) to coordinate the response; however, this body had not been set up to deal with a calamity of this scale. Unprecedented levels of funding and the massive proliferation of agencies completely overwhelmed Bakornas' capacity. The United Nations (UN) largely took over the coordination role to manage the flood of new actors, yet the extraordinary funding did not lead to an exemplary response (Telford and Cosgrave, 2007). The funding exceeded the absorption capacity of the national and international humanitarian system and facilitated the entrance of new actors with insufficient experience. It also served as a disincentive to coordinate and diminished accountability, both to donors and to affected populations (De Ville de Goyet and Moriniere, 2006). Funding decisions were often made less

on the basis of need, but rather in response to media and political pressure.

Over time, the poor transparency of aid agencies left affected populations increasingly dissatisfied with the international response (Telford and Cosgrove, 2007). An estimated 400 international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) responded to the tsunami in Aceh, delivering over 5,000 foreign staff (Volz, 2006). Very few INGOs had an ongoing presence in Aceh prior to the tsunami, presenting significant challenges due to lack of local knowledge and contextual understanding. National and local organisations were significantly undervalued, under-resourced and systematically excluded from formal coordination mechanisms (Volz, 2006). International agencies tended to exploit local capacity without investing in building it. When agencies did give funding to local organisations, local actors complained of rigid and overly demanding requirements and procedures (Scheper et. al., 2006). International actors brought in their own systems and ways of doing things, overpowering local structures, authorities and capacities.

The GOI fluctuated between under-regulation and over-regulation as it attempted to manage the massive influx of NGOs and maintain a leadership role in response. In April 2005, the government response was considerably strengthened by the establishment of the Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (BRR). This agency took over the duties of Bakornas and the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) to coordinate recovery efforts, and highlighted the importance of appointing a single coordinating agency and ensuring its authority over diverse actors (BRR, 2009). The GOI undertook ambitious institutional learning following the tsunami response, determined not to meet the same fate for future emergencies, and kickstarted the process of major disaster management reform in Indonesia.

What did this response teach us about the four priority areas?



Coordination

Coordination in Aceh was characterised by the extreme proliferation of agencies and massive amounts of funding available, leading to the duplication and confusion of efforts, increased load on affected populations, local authorities and coordination structures, and increased risk of inappropriate aid. Formal coordination mechanisms excluded national and local actors and broke down at the local level.

The response demonstrated that coordination structures can appear to be sound but may easily break down in practice if they are not sufficiently resourced and inclusive of all actors on the ground. Ad hoc government coordination bodies and mechanisms were unable to manage a disaster of this scale, leading to gaps and breakdown of government leadership.



Accountability

Evaluations found that the response demonstrated minimal accountability to affected populations. Aid agencies did not operate transparently and communities lacked access to basic information. Unfulfilled promises and poor information flows were cited as the biggest source of dissatisfaction, anger and frustration among affected communities (Christoplos, 2006). Affected people also complained that NGOs dealt only with village officials, providing aid to those who were most visible but often further marginalising the most vulnerable (Telford and Cosgrave, 2006).



Funding

The massive amount of funding available was unable to be appropriately absorbed into the system, and both the government and international agencies failed to ensure that funding allocation was based on need. The small number of organisations with the will and capacity to absorb the scale of funding was a major constraint.

Several funding channels were established.³ Funds were controlled by the GOI and/or BRR, but generally lacked transparency and were inaccessible to smaller organisations (Masyrafah and McKeon, 2008).

Overall, 70% of private donations (an estimated USD3.9 billion) went to only 12 bodies, being the Red Cross Movement, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the 10 largest international NGOs.⁴ Most official funding went to UN agencies (Flint and Goyder, 2006); minimal funding was available to national and local actors.



Capacity

The response revealed weaknesses in local and national response capacities. Bakornas, as well as its provincial and district counterparts, were ill equipped to provide the much-needed operational capacity and coordination for the national and international response. This demonstrated the need for an overhaul of the disaster management architecture in Indonesia and increased focus on capacity development and preparedness for disaster response.

Lack of engagement with civil society organisations (CSOs) and local NGOs further undermined local capacities. These groups played a key role in initial search and rescue, but were marginalised in the relief phase, so were unprepared when international agencies sought their cooperation and handover in the recovery phase (Scheper et al., 2006). Local capacities were largely overlooked by internationals, and effectively drawn on only through a few pre-existing long-term partnerships.

³ Funding channels for this response included the Multi-Donor Fund, Government on-Treasury funds, Aceh-Nias Trust Fund, multi-lateral funds through the Asian Development Bank, and bilateral funding agreements.

⁴ The 10 largest INGOs at this time were Oxfam, World Vision, Swiss Solidarity, CARE, CRS, ADH Aktion Deutschland Hilft, Save the Children, AmeriCares, DZI and Christian Aid.

2.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM IN INDONESIA

The 2004 tsunami response highlighted the inadequacies in Indonesia's disaster management structure. Located in one of the most disaster-prone regions of the world, Indonesia has had a coordination structure for disaster response for more than 50 years. It has evolved with increasing responsibilities and shifting mandates in response to changing expectations, events and politics. The most notable shift occurred with the passage of the new Disaster Management Law in 2007, which was developed to answer shortcomings in the tsunami response (Willets-King, 2009).

Prior to this law, Bakornas was responsible for coordinating disaster management in the absence of an overarching legislative framework. Bakornas was established in 1979 to succeed the Advisory Board of Natural Disaster Management, and experienced several restructures and mandate shifts until it was replaced in 2007. Willingness to increase the legitimacy of Bakornas existed between 2000 and 2007, yet it remained an ad hoc committee with a mandate for coordination but with little authority over key actors, insufficient resources and minimal standing operational capacity (Lassa, 2013; USAID, 2007). Bakornas also had correlated ad hoc provincial and district level mechanisms, but their response capacity has been described as inconsistent (Willets-King, 2009).

The tsunami essentially wiped out any existing disaster management structures at sub-national levels, and the national coordination procedures of Bakornas were unclear or unknown to both national and international actors, severely hindering the effectiveness of immediate relief. While there had been earlier calls for reform, experiences following the tsunami demonstrated that Bakornas' ad hoc nature, weak mandate and lack of institutionalised systems would be insufficient for future emergencies. This catalysed a shift towards a more comprehensive management of disaster, rather than a mere response to an emergency as Bakornas has been mandated in the past.

The response also served as a wake-up call for Indonesia and the international community to just how vulnerable the world is to natural hazards. It highlighted the importance of tackling disaster risk from the core, by strengthening disaster risk reduction (DRR), preparedness and resilience. This was formalised with the adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action in 2005, the world's first comprehensive agreement on DRR. The Hyogo Framework led to a paradigm shift across the globe, including in Indonesia, to look past emergency response towards a broader approach to risk management that included preparedness, prevention and risk reduction (Leoni, 2014).

The 2007 Disaster Management Law was the result of calls from non-state actors for reform following the major disasters between 2004 and 2006.⁵ It reflected converging expectations that the government could do more to prepare and respond to disasters and that this should be done in a more transparent way. It was developed through collaboration between Parliament, Indonesian civil society and international agencies to capture priorities across the system through extensive consultation (Willets-King, 2009).

⁵ Notably, the 2004 Aceh tsunami, 2005 Nias earthquake, 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake and the 2006 Pangandaran earthquake.

2.3 2007 DISASTER MANAGEMENT REFORM

The passage of the new Disaster Management Law (No. 24) in 2007 completely overhauled the response framework in Indonesia. According to a leading study on the evolution of Indonesian disaster management (Willets-King, 2009, p.11) it enacted a paradigm shift in the expectation of disaster management with respect to three key elements:

- ▶ Shifting the focus away from solely emergency response, to include all aspects of the disaster cycle, particularly prevention and preparedness
- ▶ Legislating that protection against disaster must be provided by the government, not out of obligation but for the fulfilment of the basic human rights of affected Indonesians
- ▶ Mandating that the responsibility for disaster management does not lie only with the government, but is a shared responsibility of all of society.

The law has been recognised as the first comprehensive disaster management law which delineates national and sub-national government responsibilities, community rights and obligations, roles of businesses and international organisations, disaster management stages and requirements, and disaster aid finance and management. Civil society was instrumental in driving the legal reform, and took on a much more recognised role in disaster management after the law's passage (Brown et al., 2016).

The law adapted various aspects of the Hyogo Declaration, echoing the growing emphasis on DRR, which was declared one of the nine national development priorities for Indonesia in 2008. In line with commitments in the Hyogo Framework for Action, Indonesia also established a National Platform for DRR (PLANAS PRB) and a National Action Plan for DRR 2006–2009 (Planas PRB, 2009).

One of the most important developments of the new disaster management law was the establishment of the National Disaster

Management Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana – BNPB) to succeed Bakornas. Still the primary agency today, BNPB replaced the ad hoc, under-resourced coordinating body with a larger, permanent organisation with agency status. In an emergency, BNPB has the authority to direct line ministries and it is independently funded to ensure appropriate resourcing. Additionally, it is supplemented by permanent structures at the provincial and district level, known as Provincial Disaster Management Agencies (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah – BPBDs). This arrangement reflected a rebalancing of power between the line ministries and the disaster management agency, giving BNPB more authority and a more operational mandate (Willets-King, 2009).

BNPB was set up to be a 'superpower' in emergencies (Willets-King, 2009). The intention was to give the government a one-stop-shop for coordination and control of disaster management and response, with the capacity, resources and authority to maintain a leadership role in the presence of international actors. However, contextual factors limited the reach of these reforms, notwithstanding their scale. One key factor was the Regional Autonomy Laws, which dated from 1999 and came into force in 2001. These laws promoted the decentralisation of government and shifted the distribution of power across sub-national structures such as provinces, districts and municipalities. The principle of regional autonomy limited the extent to which centralised reforms could mandate specific priorities or responsibilities for these levels of government.

Nonetheless, GOI leadership has consistently been cited as a key driver of disaster management and humanitarian reform. BNPB has acknowledged that the process of reform was 'based on international policy direction,' highlighting the importance of global reform efforts (BNPB and UNDP 2009, cited in Lassa, 2013). However, the process has been led by the national government and contextualised to suit an Indonesian reality.

2.4 CONSOLIDATION OF REFORMS 2007-2016

Disaster management and humanitarian structures and policies continued to evolve under the leadership of BNPB and with the support of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which has maintained a presence in Indonesia since 1999.

Significant reforms in this period included:

-  **Clarifying the Emergency Response Command System** (Reg. 10/2008)
-  **Defining the role of international organisations and foreign NGOs during emergency response** (Reg. 23/2008; Reg. 22/2010)
-  **Guidelines for the management of funding** (Reg. 22/2008; Reg. 23/2010; Reg. 6A/2011)
-  **Recognising and institutionalising the role of civil society in disaster management** (Reg. 11/2014)
-  **Overseeing protection and inclusion in disaster management** (Reg. 13/2014; Reg. 14/2014)
-  **Establishing the national cluster system** (BNPB Cluster System Decree No. 173/2014)
-  **Establishing the Indonesia Emergency Management System** (Reg. 3/2016)

A full list of BNPB regulations can be found at: <https://web.bnpb.go.id/jdih/>

Following the passage of Law 24/2007, Indonesia continued to improve its disaster management policies and laws. Additional legislation has provided clearer understanding of roles and responsibilities and national structures and processes. Only two years after its major reforms, it was argued that the GOI had proven itself able to make accurate assessments of where it had capacity and where it needed assistance to respond to disasters (Willets-King, 2009). While it continues to accept international assistance when necessary, assistance is accepted on Indonesian terms and coordinated by government, with international actors and mechanisms acting as support rather than lead.


The Indonesian National Society of the Red Cross Red Crescent (RCRC) Movement (Palang Merah Indonesia-PMI) and IFRC have also been key drivers of reform in Indonesia. PMI worked closely with the GOI in redefining the roles of international actors in disaster response and towards the facilitation and regulation of international disaster response law (IDRL) in Indonesia. The adoption of the IDRL Guidelines⁶ by National Societies and Governments at the 30th RCRC International Conference in 2007, aligned with BNPB reforms and can be considered among the early global milestones that shifted the direction of the humanitarian system towards a more localised approach (IFRC and PMI, 2014).

OCHA has additionally assisted in the capacity development of BNPB. The GOI officially embraced the global cluster approach in 2010, with OCHA leading inter-cluster coordination and contingency planning. The contingency planning process served to ensure appropriate preparation by the clusters to effectively respond in emergencies. In the years following reform, OCHA met regularly with BNPB and the line ministries involved in emergency response to strengthen preparedness measures and capacity development of the national bodies (OCHA, 2012).

⁶ The IDRL Guidelines are a set of recommendations to governments on how to prepare their disaster laws and plans for the common regulatory problems in international disaster relief operations, including minimum quality standards and required legal facilities for aid work.

Lessons learned

West Java and West Sumatra earthquakes, September 2009



The mandate and authority of BNPB significantly enhanced government-led coordination. Following major earthquakes in West Java and West Sumatra in 2009, BNPB and the GOI were keen to demonstrate that five years after the Aceh tsunami, they could respond to a disaster efficiently and effectively without international assistance (DARA, 2010). However, a lack of local capacity and the absence of an established provincial disaster management agency in

West Java meant the government opened up to international assistance, coordinated by OCHA, after one week (Bisri, 2016).

When a second earthquake hit West Sumatra less than a month later, the GOI immediately welcomed international assistance and invited OCHA to be its counterpart in coordination. The cluster system was activated immediately, with 10 clusters comprised of both local and international actors and appointment of government ministries as counterparts to UN cluster leads. The West Sumatra response learned from the response in West Java to further institutionalise the cluster system and demonstrate more effective cooperation between national and international structures (Bisri, 2016).

Mentawai and Merapi disasters, October 2010



In 2010, the Mentawai Islands were hit with an earthquake and tsunami, followed closely by the eruption of Mt Merapi in Central Java. BNPB led both responses with support from the respective BPBDs and TNI for search and rescue and evacuations. OCHA led inter-agency rapid needs assessment and coordinated all incoming international assistance. OCHA additionally established a website to facilitate coordination and information sharing, which was then handed

over to the GOI and supported civil society through the National Platform for DRR to set up the Information Management Network (OCHA, 2012).

The eruption affected over 350,000 people, killing more than 300 due to tardy evacuation or people returning home before the event was over. Following this disaster, better early warning, prevention and mitigation strategies were implemented and saved hundreds of lives when Mt Merapi became active again in 2013 (WHO, 2014). Reconstruction following the Mt Merapi eruption built on learnings from the reconstruction efforts following the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake and the establishment of the REKOMPAK project⁷ and Java Reconstruction Fund, which allowed a more streamlined and effective recovery phase (World Bank, 2010).

⁷ The REKOMPAK project rebuilds public infrastructure and assists risk mitigation efforts and readiness for disasters in villages which suffered from earthquake impacts. It employs a community-based approach, particularly in planning, priority setting and implementation stages.

In 2014, the GOI adopted the cluster approach as a national mechanism for multi-stakeholder coordination on humanitarian issues in Indonesia. This established eight national clusters, led by government ministries rather than UN agencies and international organisations (see Figure A).⁸

Each cluster is supported by a UN agency, but is predominantly coordinated and managed by the GOI. This forced international agencies into a supportive role and elevated national capacities to drive emergency response.

Figure A: National Cluster System

Government Agency	Supporting agency	Cluster
Ministry of Health	WHO / UNICEF	Health <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Psychosocial support • Reproductive health
Ministry of Education	UNICEF / Save the Children	Education
Ministry of Social Affairs	IOM, IFRC, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNFPA	Displacement and protection <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) • Shelter • WASH • Protection of Vulnerable Groups • Cash and Voucher Assistance • Community Engagement
BNPB	WFP	Logistics
Ministry of Home Affairs	UNDP	Early Recovery
Ministry of Public Works	WFP	Emergency Telecommunications
Ministry of Agriculture	FAO / WFP	Food Security and Agriculture
BASARNAS	OCHA	Search and rescue

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
 IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
 IOM International Organization for Migration
 OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
 UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
 UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
 UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
 WFP World Food Programme
 WHO World Health Organization

⁸ Source: ACMC, HAG, OCHA and AHA Centre. (2020). Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in Emergencies: Towards a Predictable Model.

However, coordination remains a persistent challenge in disaster management and response due to tensions between the roles and responsibilities of national, provincial and district governments. The establishment of government operational clusters in 2014 has aided coordination at the national level, but also created difficulties at local levels: many local actors report that they do not understand these mechanisms (Ascholani, 2017; HCT, 2018). Local coordination mechanisms are often adapted from national structures and set up in an ad hoc fashion according to what local authorities deem appropriate (ACMC, HAG, OCHA and AHA Centre, 2020). Regulation BNPB Reg. 3/2016 institutionalised the Emergency Management System (EMS) for coordination, yet these structures and regulations were not appropriately socialised to local authorities, creating challenges for coherence of coordination (Ascholani, 2017; HCT, 2018).

Beginning in 2016, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT; see section 3.1) began commissioning Lessons Learned reports following major disasters across Indonesia in order to learn from and improve preparedness and response to future disasters.⁹ The first was produced following the Pidie Jaya earthquake in 2016. The response was led by provincial and district authorities, coordinating a range of actors across the national government ministries (including BNPB), local and international NGOs, local government from across Indonesia, universities and private sector actors. Coordination was difficult because the new regulations around EMS were not sufficiently understood (Ascholani, 2017). The evaluation highlighted the gap between established national systems and local implementation. It argued that while local actors were increasingly taking on greater roles in response, investment in local systems and processes had been insufficient.

Local coordination has repeatedly been acknowledged as a challenge in response evaluations (Wilson and Reily, 2007; Masyrafah and McKeon, 2008; Ascholani, 2017; HCT, 2018).

However, outside of formal coordination structures, there are additionally a number of rich and diverse NGO networks in Indonesia which serve to aid coordination and capacity development. For example, Humanitarian Forum Indonesia (HFI), a network of 17 national and international humanitarian organisations, has been critical in fostering partnerships, building capacity and aiding coordination in recent responses (ICRC, 2020). HFI also highlights the important role of faith-based organisations (FBOs) in disaster response, particularly Muhammadiyah, Indonesia's second largest Muslim organisation, and the Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Centre (MCMC), which has proven itself a vital network for local coordination due to its diverse membership across civil society (Bush, 2014).

In order to further improve coordination, the development of a National Disaster Response Framework (NDRF) commenced in 2016. BNPB engaged the New Zealand Government to design the NDRF for Indonesia, which would further clarify roles and responsibilities between national and sub-national governments as well as non-government actors in response. The framework was completed in 2018, but thus far has not been operationalised. This has been attributed to a lack of sufficient government buy-in and socialisation. Actors have expressed frustration over competing coordination structures and the absence of a clear, agreed, standardised system (HAG, 2020).

While some challenges have persisted, the period following the 2004 tsunami, and the subsiding of the major conflict in Aceh, demonstrated tremendous progress in Indonesia's disaster management structures and humanitarian system. The reforms of this period have provided the foundation for government-led responses in Indonesia ever since. These national shifts occurred alongside regional and global developments in the humanitarian sector, interacting with them while also having significant impacts on the options and behaviours of international actors seeking to provide humanitarian assistance inside Indonesia.

⁹ To date, this includes lessons learned from the 2016 Pidie Jaya earthquake response, 2017 Mount Agung eruption response, 2018 Lombok and Sumbawa earthquake response and the 2018 Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami.

3. CHANGES IN THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL FRAMEWORK

The impact of the 2004 tsunami reverberated across the entire humanitarian system. Challenges in the international response led to the launch of the official Humanitarian Reform process in 2005. The process, overseen by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), was designed to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response through greater predictability, accountability, responsibility and partnership (IASC, 2020). This has led to numerous other initiatives to fill gaps in the aid architecture and to improve the overall effectiveness of humanitarian response. The model has continually evolved over the last 15

years, guiding different national and regional priorities and systems, yet thus far falling short of delivering transformative systemic change (Konyndyk, 2019).

The objective of HAG's Blueprint research is to reposition and contextualise the global reform agenda to suit national priorities, capacities and requirements. As such, it is important to analyse global and regional developments alongside Indonesian processes to understand what enabled change to occur in Indonesia and what prevented certain initiatives from having an impact.

3.1 INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN INDONESIA

The humanitarian arm of the UN has been represented in Indonesia through OCHA, the Office of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) and the HCT, consisting of UN agencies, international organisations and national NGO consortia. These bodies serve as the direct translation of global processes at the country level.

Since 1999, OCHA has been tasked with coordinating international humanitarian assistance in Indonesia. OCHA supports the cluster approach in country, facilitating inter-cluster coordination and holding regular coordination meetings outside of the clusters, which serve as an information-sharing forum for all humanitarian actors in Indonesia.

OCHA was instrumental in the development of Presidential Regulation 23/2008 on the participation of the international community in disaster management and BNPB Regulation 22/2010 on the Role of International Organisations and Foreign Non-Governmental Organisations during Emergency Response. BNPB has authority over international organisations in the pre-disaster, emergency response and post-disaster phases. Regulation 23/2008 was

developed in response to problems encountered in the 2004 tsunami response, including delays due to inadequate paperwork, complex and contradictory practices, lack of coordinated channelling of disaster aid funds, provision of expired relief items, insufficient cultural sensitivity and respect, and insufficient understanding of economic impacts (IFRC and PMI, 2014). BNPB Reg. 22/2010 clarifies the role of international agencies and explains the interface between all stakeholders, covering acceptance, management and termination of international assistance. IFRC and PMI were also critical in the development of these regulations. (IFRC and PMI, 2014).

Many of the large INGOs maintain an ongoing nationalised presence in Indonesia, and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement is very active through the Indonesia national society (PMI). The role of international agencies was transformed in 2018 (explained in more detail in Section 4) as the Indonesian system shifted towards more localised processes, restricting international access to the field. This can be seen as a result of increased international momentum towards the localisation of humanitarian action and increasing national and regional capacities.



Flags of Southeast Asia countries, AEC, ASEAN Economic Community. OPgraher / Shutterstock

3.2 REGIONAL INITIATIVES

Increasing regional cooperation and solidarity has been a defining feature of humanitarian response in Asia over the last several years. The Asia-Pacific Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (APMCDRR) was first held in 2005 in response to the increased focus on DRR globally and in the region. The biennial conference is jointly hosted by rotating countries and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR). It serves as a forum for stakeholders to share responsibility and make actionable commitments towards implementation of DRR in the region through the exchange of successful practices and innovative approaches in reducing and managing disaster risk. Indonesia hosted the APMCDRR in 2012, and has consistently been an active participant in this forum.

Indonesia was one of the five founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the regional intergovernmental organisation established in 1967 to promote cooperation, stability and growth among member countries (now totalling 10). The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) was ratified in 2009 and has been revised and renewed every five years. The AADMER 2010–2015 Work Programme laid the foundations for regional mechanisms for joint disaster response and risk

reduction, while the 2016–2020 iteration further protected and emphasised the gains of ASEAN community integration and ASEAN leadership in this field (ASEAN, 2020).

The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Disaster Assistance (AHA Centre) was established in 2011 to further strengthen regional cooperation in disaster management and provide additional services to ASEAN member states affected by disaster. In 2016, ASEAN leaders signed the One ASEAN One Response Declaration, further solidifying this shift. According to the AHA Centre, the response to the Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami in 2018 was a realisation of the One ASEAN One Response vision (AHA Centre, 2018a). The AHA Centre emerged as a major player in the Central Sulawesi response, working alongside BNPB, OCHA and other humanitarian partners to promote interoperability and manage the international response. The Centre served as the central information and communications hub, with UN services working to supplement regional capabilities rather than lead. For the first time in its history, the AHA Centre continued its presence in Central Sulawesi into the recovery phase (AHA Centre, 2018a). This response set a precedent for future ASEAN responses and marked the further evolution of roles and responsibilities for disaster response in Indonesia.



Switzerland; Geneva; March 9, 2018; The rows of the United Nations member states flags in front of the United Nations Office in Geneva. Bascar / Shutterstock

3.3 GLOBAL INITIATIVES

Global humanitarian reform processes have produced multiple rounds of reform priorities and revised agendas since the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. Each update has built on previous initiatives and responded to learnings from various international responses.

Global reform processes

- 2005**  Humanitarian reform process rolled out; Cluster system introduced; Hyogo Framework for Action adopted
- 2006**  Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) established
- 2007**  Principles of Partnership endorsed by Global Humanitarian Platform
- 2011**  Transformative Agenda endorsed
- 2012**  IASC Task Force on Accountability to Affect Populations established
- 2014**  Core Humanitarian Standard is launched; country-based pooled funds established
- 2015**  Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction adopted
- 2016**  WHS, Agenda for Humanity, Grand Bargain launched

These initiatives have had mixed effects on the reform landscape in Indonesia.



Introduction of global cluster approach

After being piloted in the 2005 Pakistan earthquake response, the cluster system was applied for the second time in the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake. It was rolled out again in response to the West Java and West Sumatra earthquakes in 2009, formally embraced by the GOI in 2010 with the passage of Reg. 22/2010, and further adapted as a national process in 2014.



Hyogo Framework for Action adopted

This led to increased focus on DRR globally and particularly in Indonesia. Aspects of the Framework for Action were incorporated in the Disaster Management Law, and Indonesia established a National Platform for DRR and a National Action Plan for DRR in 2006 (Planas PRB, 2009).



Establishment of CERF

The CERF has been accessed in response to floods in Aceh in 2007, the West Sumatra earthquake in 2009 and the Central Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami in 2018 (CERF, 2020). Allocations from CERF have allowed UN agencies to support GOI-led responses.



Principles of Partnership

Following endorsement, the Principles of Partnership were tested in Indonesia, Zimbabwe and El Salvador. Their endorsement has become a common point of reference; however, implementing them has remained difficult in practice (Knudsen, 2011). It could be argued that these principles (equality, transparency, results-oriented approach, responsibility and complementarity) have contributed to the development of new partnership models in Indonesia following the Central Sulawesi earthquake (see Section 4).



Transformative Agenda

The Transformative Agenda focused on three key areas: leadership, coordination and accountability. This strengthened the role of the RC/HC and HCT and improved cluster coordination in Indonesia. It also highlighted the need for improved needs assessment, information management and accountability to affected communities (IASC, 2020).



Core Humanitarian Standard

The Indonesian National Standards on Humanitarian Response were adopted in 2014, referencing the international quality and accountability standards. The process was led by BNPB and PMI, with input from various humanitarian NGOs (Sphere, 2014). The CHS was translated into Bahasa and launched at two events in Indonesia in 2015, including a session on its implications for humanitarian actors and civil society in Indonesia (Sphere, 2015).



Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction

Indonesia has embraced the Sendai Framework and committed to its implementation in national and local development plans. BNPB has committed to aligning its Disaster Management Plan to the Sendai Framework, and has expanded efforts to include the private sector as a key actor to reduce the country's disaster risk (McElroy, 2015).

The World Humanitarian Summit and the Grand Bargain

The reform agenda is currently driven by outcomes from the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in 2016 and the launch of the Grand Bargain. This includes commitments to:

- ▶ Greater transparency
- ▶ More support and funding to local and national responders
- ▶ Increasing the use and coordination of cash-based programming
- ▶ Reducing duplication and management costs with periodic functional reviews
- ▶ Improving joint and impartial needs assessment
- ▶ A Participation Revolution to include affected communities in decision-making
- ▶ Increasing collaborative humanitarian multi-year, un-earmarked funding
- ▶ Harmonising and simplifying reporting requirements.

This agenda speaks directly to the four areas that the Blueprint research has identified as priorities in Indonesia, yet progress towards the Grand Bargain commitments has been uneven. While the summit reinvigorated the momentum for reform, demonstrating widespread agreement on what needs to change and the desire to get there, it has been criticised as a one-size-fits all approach with too many competing commitments and a lack of clear leadership and political will (Canyon and Burkle, 2016; Metcalfe-Hough, Fenton and Poole, 2019). However, components of the Grand Bargain and the momentum that it generated have in some ways been translated to an Indonesian context, demonstrating that nationally led, contextualised reform has the potential to be successful in Indonesia.

Indonesia has committed to global humanitarian reform, including through the five key commitments it made at the WHS:

- ▶ Strengthening the role of Indonesia in maintaining international peace and security
- ▶ Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 through the integration of DRR in national and local development plans
- ▶ Continuing to advance gender equality and empowerment of women and girls
- ▶ Strengthening cooperation in managing irregular migration issues, particularly through the Bali Process mechanism
- ▶ Increasing local capacity to cope with humanitarian disasters and crises.¹⁰

One of the most notable contributions of the WHS to humanitarian reform in Indonesia has been the push for localisation. While these processes have been underway for years in Indonesia under the leadership of the GOI, the WHS accelerated this shift and led to several new regulations and practices in Indonesia (Robillard, Howe, Rosenstock and Munive, 2018). These shaped two major responses in 2018, which are explored in more detail in the following section.


¹⁰ 'Indonesia calls for enhanced prevention in the World Humanitarian Summit,' Statement of the Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia in the World Humanitarian Summit, May 2016.

4. THE PUSH FOR LOCALISATION

As government capacity continued to expand in Indonesia and the region, with ASEAN taking a more prominent role in disaster management and promoting an increased focus on regional cooperation and solidarity, Indonesia began to look less towards the international community for humanitarian assistance. This shift has had ripples across the Asia-Pacific region. Particularly over the last five years, following the massive international response to Cyclone Pam, which overwhelmed Vanuatu in 2015, other nations in the region have been determined to exert more control and prevent a similar sense of overwhelm (Loy, 2017).

The next major paradigm shift in the humanitarian system in Indonesia occurred in 2018, in response to two major disasters in Lombok and Sulawesi, and building on momentum generated by the WHS. The Sulawesi response has gathered the most widespread attention and analysis due to the scale of the disaster and the unique international response. It further elevated the localisation agenda and demonstrated how the global rhetoric could manifest in practice. The push for localisation has demonstrated strong government leadership and increasing national capacities, yet many challenges remain, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

4.1 2018 CENTRAL SULAWESI RESPONSE



In September 2018, an earthquake and resulting tsunami devastated the coastal township of Palu in Central Sulawesi, killing more than 2,000 people and displacing at least 200,000 (AHA Centre, 2018b). Immediately following the disaster, the GOI acted quickly to establish clear leadership and set parameters around the type and quantity of assistance required from the international community.

BNPB issued regulations, which were first enforced following a series of earthquakes in Lombok in August, but more openly put to the test in Sulawesi. The new regulations restricted international access to the disaster sites. International organisations were denied the option to implement directly in the field, and required to work through local partners; all assistance had to be registered and coordinated with local authorities and any foreign personnel already deployed were removed (AHA Centre, 2018a).

The government claimed that restrictions on foreign staff were necessary to coordinate international assistance, with a BNPB spokesperson explaining that 'letting foreigners enter disaster-hit areas without limitations and clear management would just give the country's task force more work' (Arbi, Anya and Hajramuni, 2018). This emphasised the priority given to national structures and systems, as internationals were forced to play a different supporting role. While the reliance on NNGOs as implementing partners was not new to Indonesia, the new regulations accelerated this trend and required



A ship stranded on land after the earthquake and tsunami in Wani village. SOPA Images Limited / Alamy Stock Photo

international organisations to further prioritise strengthened, long-term partnerships (HAG, 2019).

BNPB's regulations also affected the role of OCHA. In the absence of implementing international agencies and alongside a functional national cluster system (established in 2014), OCHA's role, although still important, was less prominent in the response. Rather, OCHA was asked to play a supporting role to the AHA Centre as the ASEAN-UN interoperability mechanism was rolled out for the first time (AHA Centre, 2018c). The AHA Centre took on roles at the national level typically played by the UN, including the issuing of situation reports and the coordination of international assistance with BNPB (HAG, 2019). PMI also played a key role in supporting the government and regulating international assistance (IFRC, 2019). OCHA maintained a strong presence behind the scenes in supporting coordination but allowed national and regional actors to take the lead.

Additionally, national NGOs (NNGOs) were able to take a much more prominent role as INGOs stepped to the side. In the Sulawesi response, there were examples in which NNGOs played a supportive and capacity-building role for smaller local NGOs, which did most of the direct implementation (Robillard et al., 2020). Coordination meetings were conducted in the national language (Bahasa Indonesia) and allowed for much greater participation of local

organisations and civil society. Local actors additionally created informal coordination mechanisms outside the formal cluster system, relying heavily on WhatsApp and social media communication (HAG, 2019). While problems with local-level coordination persisted, local actors were far more recognised and equipped to contribute meaningfully to the response.

The regulation added value to the response by giving affected populations and local actors a stronger voice in the response. New ways of working improved coordination and consistency in aid delivery and built the skills of both local and international actors. The main criticism has been that the lack of clarity and transparency in GOI policy led to some confusion and inconsistency in the acceptance and implementation of aid (Loy, 2018; Robillard et al., 2020). Additionally, the HCT Lessons Learned report highlights the lack of accessible data and information management capacity as main barriers to more effective coordination and stronger accountability (HCT, 2019).

The Sulawesi response had direct implications for all four priority areas identified in the Blueprint research. While new ways of working presented some challenges for the response, overall, the restrictions placed on international actors were largely seen as a positive change across most categories of humanitarian response (Robillard et al., 2020).



25 October 2018: Houses under debris after the tsunami and demprem in Palu, Indonesia. Ramazan Nacar / Shutterstock

4.2 IMPLICATIONS OF THE CENTRAL SULAWESI RESPONSE

The GOI has taken significant steps to overhaul the national disaster management coordination architecture since the 2004 tsunami. The Sulawesi response exemplified the magnitude of this transformation. In the absence of international agencies in the field and with OCHA playing a supporting role to the AHA Centre in coordination, the response shone a spotlight on regional, national and local capacities and set what some have called a precedent for how disaster response should be delivered in the region (HAG, 2019).

The role of international agencies was completely transformed in the Sulawesi response. Without access to the field, INGOs were forced to work in new ways, and exclusively through local partners. This led to innovative partnership models and increased focus on capacity development of local partners. Local organisations were no longer to be viewed as simply subcontractors and implementers, rather as valued partners in the delivery of aid. Agencies with long-term partnerships in Indonesia were able to deliver far more effectively and efficiently, encouraging international agencies to invest more in local

organisations and entities. Additionally, the leadership role of large NNGOs has become more prominent in building capacity of local actors and facilitating access to international agencies and funding (HAG, 2019; Charter for Change, 2019).

Nonetheless, this response revealed gaps in the localisation discourse, which often groups all people and institutions of crisis-affected countries in the category of 'local'. Some tensions arose around the controversial role of nationalised INGOs,¹¹ with claims that this structure does not actually shift the power towards the grassroots, instead increasing competition and allowing these organisations to maintain an unfair advantage over truly national and local entities. Most INGOs in Indonesia have created registered national chapters (Robillard et al., 2020). National actors, be they part of international structures or not, still required local partners to navigate the complexities of the local context in the affected areas. It revealed that strong national systems do not always translate to strong local systems, and the need to increase focus on capacities of local governments and at the grassroots level (Robillard et al., 2020).

¹¹ Nationalised INGOs are international NGOs that have established a national arm registered in the crisis-affected country(s) in which it works. Nationalised INGOs are often run by national staff but maintain affiliation to the international body, offering advantages in opportunities and resourcing.

What did this response teach us about the four priority areas?



Coordination

This response demonstrated the potential for an increasing role of regional bodies in the coordination of emergency response. The AHA Centre moved into roles formerly held by international actors to support the GOI's leadership.

All clusters were led by national or local government and meetings were held in the national language, facilitating much greater participation of local actors. Informal coordination mechanisms also revealed that local actors were embracing new ways of working to overcome onerous international systems (HAG, 2019). International actors, particularly OCHA, continued to play an important role in facilitating effective coordination, yet the process was far more nationally and locally owned (Robillard et al., 2020; HAG, 2019).



Accountability

The Sulawesi response has been credited with advancing collective AAP in emergency response. The Indonesia HCT issued a Response Plan with direct commitments to AAP and prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), and a range of activities were implemented through the **Community Engagement Working Group**. This included advocating for and integrating people's information needs and preferences, coordinating messaging to address community needs, and providing a structured reporting and response mechanism for complaints of SEA. These activities provided humanitarian leadership with regular community feedback to guide adaptation of programming and improvements to accountability (Davies, 2019).



Funding

Unfortunately, funding allocations in this response still did not decisively embrace direct funding of national actors. According to OCHA's financial tracking system (FTS), more than 65% of funding was channelled through the UN and the largest INGOs. Most local organisations cannot access funds from international institutions, with donor compliance recognised as the main barrier to direct funding (Charter for Change, 2019; HAG, 2019).

However, local and national actors were able to tap into non-traditional sources of funding which were not captured in the FTS. This included local humanitarian standby funds and resources raised by faith-based networks across the country. National organisations were able to act as intermediaries to effectively channel funds to local organisations (HAG, 2019).



Capacity

The response was nationally led, putting the GOI's years of investment in disaster management to the test. In the first weeks, 96% of reported activities were implemented through local and national NGOs, PMI and the government (AHA Centre and OCHA, 2020).

Partnerships were a key feature of this response, allowing international actors to support local and national organisations. Local partners facilitated more rapid and appropriate responses, while international actors provided capacity building, monitoring functions and funding. However, some local NGOs still felt that they were treated as implementers rather than partners (Robillard et al., 2020). Evaluations have recommended that capacity-strengthening efforts need to go beyond national systems to include local authorities and grassroots actors (HCT, 2019).

The Sulawesi response has generally been seen as a turning point for humanitarian response in Indonesia, and it is hoped it will set a precedent for aid delivery. It demonstrated the beginnings of a transformation in the system and produced optimism about the realisation of some of the WHS commitments made in 2016. However, this momentum has largely halted due to the current COVID-19 pandemic, which has overwhelmed not only the humanitarian system, but every element

of society. It has turned the global reform agenda on its head and revealed the need for much greater systemic transformation than could have been imagined in 2016. This research will not investigate the COVID-19 response so much as it will recognise the pandemic as the new context in which the system must now operate and adapt. While the impact on Indonesia has been devastating, there is hope that the necessary change will occur in the wake of this crisis.

4.3 THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN INDONESIA



Surabaya, Indonesia - June 01: Healthcare workers take mass rapid and swab Covid-19 tests amid the pandemic to stem the spread of Coronavirus. Robertus Pudyanto / Shutterstock

The COVID-19 pandemic has left no corner of the world untouched. It has wrought havoc across populations and overturned systems, forcing an unprecedented global response. The GOI's slow response and lack of transparency has been criticised both domestically and internationally as leaving the country inundated with cases and the population with insufficient support (Noer, 2020; Oley and Diningrat, 2020).

Although criticised for not taking the response seriously enough in the early stages of the outbreak, the government has since issued many regulations in response to the pandemic. These have included social distancing rules, work from home policy, school from home policy, restrictions on international visitors, and financial adjustment policies, as well as regulations issued by the ministries in response to the complex

impacts on health, the economy, education and social conditions. On 11 March 2020, the President appointed the head of BNPB to be the coordinator for the National Task Force on COVID-19, with provincial Task Forces established soon after.

The government released a multi-sectoral response plan (MSRP) in May and updated it in November. The plan was designed in accordance with the disaster management phases: preparedness, disaster readiness/alert, disaster response and rehabilitation. The plan utilises the National Cluster approach that BNPB regulates. International cluster leads are supporting their national counterparts with the support of OCHA; however, information flow and support to local level Task Forces and local actors has been poor (Lassa et al., 2020; OCHA and UNRCO, 2020).

The pandemic has transcended traditional humanitarian boundaries, demanding an integrated multi-sectoral response. The GOI has embraced the Penta Helix concept¹² in disaster management, urging collaboration across government, civil society, private sector, academia and media. This has encouraged a whole-of-society response to the pandemic and contributed to current efforts to revise the 2007 Disaster Management Law¹³ – a process which has been both influenced and disrupted by the pandemic (OCHA, 2020).

However, there have also been concerns about public information management and transparency. Regulations are reported to be inconsistent across the country, and poor

coordination between state institutions and central and local government has hampered an effective response (Indonesia Corruption Watch et al., 2020). Inaccurate information initially spread quickly through the population, but has been largely combated by the Risk Communication and Community Engagement Working Group, under the command of the National Task Force. The working group includes representatives of the government, UN agencies, PMI, NGOs and CSOs. The government and various agencies have also opened channels for community feedback through hotlines, SMS, WhatsApp, ChatBots, interactive radio shows and social media accounts (PMI, IFRC, UNICEF, OCHA and BNPB, 2020).

4.4 COVID-19 AND HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

While international actor presence in Indonesia was already quite limited, the evacuation of remaining international actors due to the pandemic has left a vacuum that national and local capacities are struggling to fill. Increased reliance on local organisations and civil society has presented opportunities for further advancement of the localisation agenda; however, in the absence of greater support, local actors are struggling to mount effective responses to the public health crisis and other, overlapping disasters at the scale required (CGD, HAG, Pujiono Centre and NEAR, 2021).

Gaps in the formal response early on led to the development of initiatives such as Sekretariat Jaringan-Antar-jaringan OMS-LSM (translated as Network-of-Networks of Civil Society Organizations, and abbreviated as SEJAJAR), providing a multi-sectoral platform for NGOs and CSOs to collaborate and coordinate the local COVID-19 response (Lassa et. al., 2020). The experiences of SEJAJAR provide insight into potential reforms in the post-pandemic era.¹⁴ HFI

has also been critical in supporting an effective COVID-19 response, including by organising webinars and facilitating capacity building and coordination among members (ICRC, 2020).

The pandemic has also furthered recognition of the role of faith-based organisations (FBOs) in humanitarian and disaster response. FBOs have maintained a large presence in Indonesia for decades, but recent localised responses and particularly the pandemic have underscored the important role that these actors and networks play. Religious leaders and FBOs have been critical in supporting authorities in tackling the spread of the virus. They maintain strong influence and reach throughout communities to spread public health messages and to provide logistical support and health services (ICRC, 2020).

Parallel to government initiatives, INGOs, NGOs, humanitarian consortia, FBOs and CSOs have raised private funds to supplement the COVID-19 response. There is currently no regulation on cooperation or coordination between the

¹² The Penta Helix concept is a multi-stakeholder approach that has been applied across numerous sectors to encourage cooperation and collaboration between administration (government), society (people), business/investors, knowledge (researchers), and media in planning, processes and innovation. It has been adapted specifically for disaster management by BNPB

¹³ At the time of writing, the GOI was revising the Disaster Management Law. This process has been heavily consultative and driven largely by civil society. The updated law is expected to be passed in early 2021.

¹⁴ In the period of March to July 2020, the Blueprint project pivoted to support the establishment of SEJAJAR through the Pujiono Centre in partnership with Oxfam Indonesia and Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Centre. Learnings from this initiative are explored in HAG, [Learnings from the Seजार initiative in Indonesia](#), 2021.

humanitarian organisations and the government committees, or regulations for how to manage funding from the community. This has hampered the monitoring and accountability of independently funded COVID control activities (ICRC, 2020).

In a recent workshop co-hosted by the Centre for Global Development (CGD), HAG, Pujiono Centre and the Network for Empowered Aid Response (NEAR), participants from various Indonesian NGOs and CSOs explained their persistent difficulties with both coordination and funding. Several CSO-NGO networks were mobilised across the country to supplement the national pandemic response and aid both local coordination and fundraising for grassroots actors, yet these mechanisms were often under-resourced and lacked staying power. Actors expressed frustration with the national cluster system not translating to the local level. The workshop also highlighted the importance of expanding the conversation for humanitarian reform to include frontline CSOs in Indonesia that fall outside the scope of the traditional humanitarian system, but which are carrying out most of the COVID-19 response. Investment in these actors will be crucial to boost capacity and coordination and overall, to mount an effective response in the current, and likely future, context of the pandemic (CGD, HAG, Pujiono Centre and NEAR, 2021).

These experiences in Indonesia illustrate the struggle of NGOs and CSOs worldwide to access international funding. When OCHA first released the Global Humanitarian Response Plan (GHRP) in July, there was no mechanism for NGO funding, with 95% of the total allocated to UN agencies (Tarpey, 2020). In June, CGD reported that NGOs received only 3% of total GHRP funding, with only 0.07% directed to local and national organisations. CGD research also demonstrates that UN funding allocations have been extremely slow to reach the frontlines (Konyndyk, Saez and Worden, 2020). The importance of local leadership and strengthened capacity of local frontline delivery has been further elevated by this response, yet the follow-through is lacking.

Throughout the pandemic, Indonesia has continued to experience overlapping disasters. This has further strained an already stretched system and continued to place increasing pressure on local actors. However, new ways of working have also presented opportunities for innovative solutions. While the Central Sulawesi response marked a turning point in Indonesian response, it was not the end point on the journey of reform, rather only the beginning. Lessons learned from Central Sulawesi have been carried forward and adapted to suit the new COVID-19 context. For example, a recent focus group discussion held by the Pujiono Centre and HAG to explore the recent response to the West Sulawesi earthquake in January 2021, revealed that in some cases, coordination was more efficient as national actors were better able to support and facilitate local actors and systems remotely without national processes getting in the way. Additionally, regional players such as the AHA Centre have been less central to recent responses, casting questions over what role they may play in the future in a post-COVID context (HAG and Pujiono Centre, 2021).

At the time of writing, the pandemic is far from over and lessons and implications are yet to be realised. However, it is clear that the system must adapt; this was true in 2005 with respect to the tsunami, and it is true today. The pandemic has booted the humanitarian system into overdrive and highlighted its inadequacies in a new reality. The question remains, can all the rhetoric of reform and transformation be translated into practice? Amidst all the devastation, what opportunities does COVID-19 present to 'build back better' and meet the growing calls for a revolutionised system? The Grand Bargain will come to an end in 2021, sparking speculation about what will succeed it and – more importantly – how to ensure that the next remodel will bring more than lofty ambitions and good intentions. These are questions that the *Blueprint* project aims to explore in Phase 2 of the research, focusing specifically on the Indonesian context and what may be possible in the short and medium term of crisis recovery.



Lagoon with boats in small village Amed on the east of Bali, Indonesia. Volcano Gunung Agung is in the background. Yana Sutina / Shutterstock

5. CONCLUSION

This review demonstrates the tremendous change which has already occurred in the disaster management and humanitarian system in Indonesia. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami sent shock waves through the global humanitarian system and spurred a ream of reforms in Indonesia. This occurred alongside global and regional developments, but was driven by the Indonesian government and continually built upon lessons from subsequent disaster responses. The Central Sulawesi response demonstrated the culmination of progressive efforts for reform and in many ways was highly successful; however, it also revealed that there is still much work to be done. This has been further highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The pandemic has exposed gaps and weaknesses in the humanitarian system in every corner of the world. Stretched resources and new ways of working have brought many challenges, but they have also given rise to opportunities and innovative solutions. The pandemic has the

potential to cause a similar effect to the tsunami, in that it has revealed massive gaps in the global system and driven momentum and conversations for change. The humanitarian community is once again forced to reflect on how aid should and can be delivered and to recognise the dramatically shifting roles of many humanitarian actors.

In Indonesia specifically, the pandemic has run rampant, exceeding the scope of the humanitarian system and affecting all aspects of society. It has driven the momentum for reform while significantly altering the context and opportunities for future efforts. This review is useful in examining past efforts and improving understanding of the resulting changes to the system; however, it should be recognised that any new reform must also account for an entirely new context and reality on the ground.

This review has revealed some persistent barriers to reform but also highlighted several areas to reinforce and strengthen, as outlined in the table below.

	 Barriers	 Enablers
 Coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Unstandardised coordination structures and poor grounding at the local level ▶ Weak coordination between central and local government ▶ Local actors left out of formal mechanisms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Strong national system and nationally led cluster approach ▶ Absence of international actors in Sulawesi response allowed improved local coordination ▶ Greater role of regional actors (AHA Centre) in coordination, allowing a more contextually appropriate response
 Accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Lack of transparency from the government ▶ Lack of system-wide standards for accountability and transparency ▶ Lack of effective communication with affected populations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Global commitments to AAP have influenced a shift in Indonesian practice ▶ Active Community Engagement Working Group ▶ Increasing recognition of the value of civil society in understanding community needs and reaching those most vulnerable
 Resource Channels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ National and local actors are unable to access international funding ▶ Absorptive capacity and donor compliance are considerable barriers for local and national organisations ▶ Funding continues to be channelled mainly through the UN and largest INGOs ▶ Lack of predictable, non-earmarked, multi-year funding ▶ Local organisations are not aware of funding opportunities due to lack of information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ National and local organisations have raised private funds and tapped into resources from non-traditional donors ▶ In some instances, NNGOs have acted as intermediaries to funnel money to local organisations
 Capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Variable capacity across local governments delivers inconsistent response ▶ Difficulty in secure funding for capacity-strengthening activities ▶ Evacuation of international actors has left a vacuum that local actors are struggling to fill without proper support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Proven leadership and capacity to respond from central government ▶ Demonstrated ability of national actors to step up and successfully take on roles previously played by internationals ▶ Shifting partnership models have encouraged sustained long-term partnerships with increased investment in capacity development

The report demonstrates that in order for any reform to be successful in Indonesia it will need to have the strong support and commitment of the central government, yet this alone is not enough. Indonesia is generally recognised as having a sound disaster management structure and strong government leadership in response. The GOI has been largely successful in adopting various international agendas and standards; however, the findings show that form is more easily built than function. Recent responses, and particularly the COVID-19 pandemic, have brought inconsistent local structures and capacities into the spotlight. While the roles and capacities of local actors have undoubtedly increased, there remains a disconnect between national capabilities and local implementation. Effective reform in Indonesia will need to go beyond the strengthening of BNPB and national structures to reach the grassroots level in a way that is both systematic and sustainable.

Experience has demonstrated that disaster management institutions in Indonesia have often found themselves in what scholars have deemed a 'capability trap' as they try to perform tasks before they are capable. This can easily create too much pressure on organisations as local actors and governments are asked 'too much of too little, too often, too soon' (Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, 2017). This emphasises

the fundamental need for local capacity strengthening that stretches beyond emergency response.

As the responsibility for mounting response continues to fall more heavily on local and national actors, global reform agenda in a post-COVID-19 era should not seek a one-size-fits-all approach. Reform priorities will need to be contextualised to specific regions and countries to be able to reach and support frontline and grassroots organisations. Persistent barriers to direct funding and capacity development, alongside the entrenched assumptions on which the system was built, have prevented past attempts from achieving meaningful change, with the localisation discourse demonstrating good intentions but (arguably) little transformation.

The Central Sulawesi response demonstrated that change to the humanitarian system is possible, and that the momentum exists in Indonesia. While the pandemic has shifted many priorities, it hasn't erased the progress made, and it presents yet another opportunity for radical change. How the humanitarian community addresses this opportunity is yet to be seen. The next phase of the Blueprint research will seek to explore these possibilities and how they apply specifically to the Indonesian context.

The *Building a Blueprint for Change* research is currently being carried out by Humanitarian Advisory Group in partnership with the Pujiono Centre, funded by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

For more information about this research, please contact

Jesse McCommon at jmcccommon@hag.org.au or

Puji Pujiono at puji.pujiono@gmail.com.

REFERENCES

- ACMC, HAG, OCHA and AHA Centre. (2020). *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in Emergencies: Towards a Predictable Model*. RCG Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific. ACMC, Melbourne.
- Andrews, M., Pritchett, L. and Woolcock, M. (2017). *Building State Capability: Evidence, Analysis, Action*. *Oxford Scholarship Online*. Retrieved from <https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747482.001.0001/acprof-9780198747482-chapter-4>.
- Ascholani, C. (2017). *Learnings from Pidie Jaya Earthquake Response, Aceh Province*. Prepared by IFRC in support of the HCT, IFRC, Geneva.
- AHA Centre. (2018a). *Annual Report 2018: Breaking New Ground*.
- AHA Centre. (2018b). Situation Update No. 15 – Sulawesi earthquake – 26 October 2018. Retrieved from <https://ahacentre.org/situation-update/situation-update-no-15-sulawesi-earthquake-26-october-2018/>.
- AHA Centre. (2018c). One ASEAN One Response for Central Sulawesi. *The Column*. Retrieved from <https://thecolumn.ahacentre.org/posts/highlight/vol-44-one-asean-one-response-for-central-sulawesi/>.
- AHA Centre and OCHA. (2020). 4W Central Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami 2018. Retrieved from <https://data.humdata.org/visualization/4w-palu/>.
- Arbi, I., Anya, A. and Hajramuni, A. (2018). Indonesia restricts foreign helpers in Central Sulawesi to ‘avoid more work’. *The Jakarta Post*. Retrieved from <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/10/11/indonesia-restricts-foreign-helpers-in-central-sulawesi-to-avoid-more-work.html>.
- ASEAN. (2020). AADMER Work Programme. Retrieved from <https://asean.org/asean-socio-cultural/asean-agreement-on-disaster-management-and-emergency-response-cop-to-aadmer/aadmer-work-programme/>.
- Bennett, J. et al. (2006). *Coordination of international humanitarian assistance in tsunami-affected countries*. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, London.
- Bisri, M.B.F. (2016). Comparative study on inter-organisational cooperation in disaster situations and impact on humanitarian aid operations. *Journal of International Humanitarian Action*, 1(8), pp. 1-14.
- BNPB and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2018). *Indonesia National Disaster Response Framework*. BNPB, Jakarta.
- Brown, N.A., Rovins, J.E., Usdianto, B., Sinandang, K., Triutomo, S., Hayes, J. (2016). *Indonesian Disaster Response Practices and Roles*. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington.
- BRR. (2009). *10 Management Lessons for Host Governments Coordinating Post-Disaster Reconstruction*.
- BRR and World Bank. (2005). *Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias: Stocktaking of the Reconstruction Effort*. Brief for the Coordination Forum Aceh and Nias (CFAN) – October 2005. BRR and World Bank, Jakarta.

- Bush R. (2014) Muhammadiyah and Disaster Response: Innovation and Change in Humanitarian Assistance. In: Brassard C., Howitt A., Giles D. (eds) *Natural Disaster Management in the Asia-Pacific. Disaster Risk Reduction (Methods, Approaches and Practices)*. Springer, Tokyo.
- Canyon, D. and Burkle, F. (2016). The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit Report Card: Both failing marks and substantive gains for an increasingly globalised humanitarian landscape. *PLOS Current Disasters*, 1.
- CERF. (2020). Indonesia. Retrieved from <https://cerf.un.org/countries/asia/indonesia>.
- CGD, HAG, Pujiono Centre and NEAR. (2021). Turning the Grand Bargain Upside Down: View from Indonesia. Humanitarian Advisory Group. Retrieved from <https://humanitarianadvisorygroup.org/turning-the-grand-bargain-upside-down-views-from-indonesia/>.
- Charter for Change. (2019). *From commitment to action. Annual progress report 2018-2019*.
- Christoplos, I. (2006). *Links between relief, rehabilitation and development in the tsunami response*. London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition.
- Cook, A.D.B. and Chen, C. (2019). Humanitarian Action: Southeast Asia's Local Turn. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, *RSIS Commentary*, p. 246.
- DARA. (2010). *Humanitarian Response Index 2010: crisis reports Indonesia*. DARA, Madrid.
- Davies, S. (2019). The Central Sulawesi Earthquake Collective Accountability Approach: A case study of affected people influencing disaster response and recovery. Special Feature: Communication and community engagement in humanitarian response. *Humanitarian Exchange*, 74, pp. 44-46.
- Flint, M. and Goyder, H. (2006). *Funding the tsunami response*. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, London.
- Fritz Institute. (2005). *Recipient Perceptions of Aid Effectiveness: Rescue, Relief and Rehabilitation in Tsunami Affected Indonesia, India and Sri Lanka*. Fritz Institute, San Francisco.
- HAG. (2019). *Charting the New Norm? Local leadership in the first 100 days of the Sulawesi earthquake response*. HAG, Melbourne.
- HAG. (2020). *Building a Blueprint for Change: Laying the Foundations*. HAG, Melbourne.
- HAG. (2021). *Learnings from the Seजार initiative in Indonesia*. HAG, Melbourne.
- HCT. (2019). *Lessons Learned from Lombok and Sumbawa Earthquake Response, West Nusa Tenggara Province*.
- HCT. (2018). *Lessons from Mount Agung Eruption Response, Bali Province*.
- IASC. (2020). IASC Transformative Agenda. Retrieved from <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-transformative-agenda>.
- ICRC. (2020). Indonesia: Faith-based organisations share their experience in responding to COVID-19. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/indonesia-faith-based-organizations-share-their-experience-responding-covid-19>.
- IFRC. (2019). *Real-Time Evaluation, Indonesia: Earthquake and Tsunami (Lombok, Sulawesi) 2018*. IFRC, Geneva.
- IFRC and PMI. (2014). *International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) in Indonesia*. IFRC, Geneva.

Indonesia Corruption Watch, et al. (2020). *Policy Brief: The accountability of COVID-19 pandemic handling*.

Knudsen, C. (2011). *Partnership in principle, partnership in practice*. Humanitarian Practice Network. Retrieved from <https://odihpn.org/magazine/partnership-in-principle-partnership-in-practice/>.

Konyndyk, J. (2019). Five Takeaways on the Future of Humanitarian Reform. Centre for Global Development Briefing Note. <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/five-takeaways-future-humanitarian-reform>

Konyndyk, J., Saez, P. and Worden, R. (2020). Humanitarian financing is failing the COVID-19 frontlines. Centre for Global Development. Retrieved from <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/humanitarian-financing-failing-covid-19-frontlines>.

Lassa, J., Le, D.E., Talan, J., Violeta, M. and Banunaek, R. (2020). Sejajar coordination mechanism in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia. Institute of Resource Governance and Social Change, Jakarta.

Lassa, J. (2013). Disaster Policy Change in Indonesia 1930-2010: From Government to Governance?. *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, 31(2), pp. 130-159.

Leoni, B. (2014). A decade after Indian Ocean tsunami, lessons learned. UNDRR. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/decade-after-indian-ocean-tsunami-lessons-learned>.

Loy, I. (2017). Aid reform in the Pacific held up by power, purse strings and trust. *The New Humanitarian*. Retrieved from <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2017/11/14/aid-reform-pacific-held-power-purse-strings-and-trust>.

Loy, I. (2018). Why Indonesia's rules on foreign tsunami relief are rattling the aid sector. *The New Humanitarian*. Retrieved from <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2018/10/16/why-indonesia-s-rules-foreign-tsunami-relief-are-rattling-aid-sector>.

Masyrafah, H. and McKeon, J. (2008). *Post-Tsunami Aid Effectiveness in Aceh: Proliferation and Coordination in Reconstruction*. Wolfensohn Center for Development at Brookings. Working Paper 6.

McElroy, A. (2015). Business key for Sendai Framework success. UNDRR. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/business-key-sendai-framework-success>.

Metcalf-Hough, V. Fenton, W. and Poole, L. (2019). Grand Bargain annual independent report 2019. *Humanitarian Policy Group*.

Noer, H. (2020). What has hampered Indonesia's COVID-19 response?. Asia & the Pacific Policy Society, Policy Forum. Retrieved from <https://www.policyforum.net/what-has-hampered-indonesias-covid-19-response/>.

Oley, J. D. B. and Diningrat, R. A. (2020). How to fix Indonesia's COVID-19 governance problem. Indonesia at Melbourne, University of Melbourne. Retrieved from <https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/how-to-fix-indonesias-covid-19-governance-problem/>.

Planas PRB. (2009). *Lessons Learned: Indonesia's Partnership for Disaster Risk Reduction*. The National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction and the University Forum.

PMI, IFRC, UNICEF, OCHA and BNPB. (2020). *Suara Komunitas: Community perceptions of COVID-19. COVID-19 Risk Communication and Community Engagement Working Group*.

- Robillard, S., Howe, K., Rosenstock, K. and Munive, J. (2020). *'We must be the pioneers': Perspectives on localisation in the response to the 2018 Sulawesi earthquake in Indonesia*. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, Boston.
- Scheper, E., Parakrama, A. and Patel, S. (2006). *Impact of the tsunami response of local and national capacities*. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, London.
- Sphere. (2014). Indonesian national humanitarian guidelines incorporate Sphere standards. Retrieved from <https://www.spherestandards.org/indonesian-national-humanitarian-guidelines-incorporate-sphere-standards/>.
- Sphere. (2015). Core Humanitarian Standard now available in Bahasa Indonesia. Retrieved from <https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/news/core-humanitarian-standard-now-available-in-bahasa-indonesian>.
- Tarpey, F. (2020). *The international humanitarian response to COVID-19*. Development Policy Centre. Retrieved from <https://devpolicy.org/the-international-humanitarian-response-to-covid-19-20200804/>.
- Telford, J. and Cosgrave, J. (2006). Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, London.
- Telford, J. and Cosgrave, J. (2007). The international humanitarian system and the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis. *Disasters*, 31(1), p 1-28.
- UNOCHA. (2006). Indonesia Earthquake 2006 Response Plan. UNOCHA, Geneva.
- UNOCHA. (2009). West Sumatra Earthquake Humanitarian Response Plan in Coordination with the Government of Indonesia. UNOCHA, Geneva.
- UNOCHA. (2012). Profile OCHA in Indonesia. UNOCHA, Geneva.
- UNOCHA. (2020). Situation Update: Response to COVID-19 in Indonesia, from September to December 2020.
- UNOCHA and UNRCO. (2020). Indonesia Multi-sectoral Response Plan to COVID-19.
- UNOCHA, HDX. (2019). Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) Indonesia. Retrieved from <https://data.humdata.org/organization/ecb>.
- USAID. (2007). *Review of Policies and Institutional Capacity for Early Warning and Disaster Management in Indonesia*. USAID.
- Volz, C. (2006). Humanitarian coordination in Indonesia: an NGO viewpoint. *Forced Migration Review, Tsunami – Indonesia*, p. 26-27.
- WHO. (2014). Indonesia: Improving health services during emergencies. Retrieved from <http://www.who.int/features/2014/emergenciesindonesia/en/>.
- Willets-King, B. (2009). The role of the affected state in humanitarian action: A case study on Indonesia. HPG Working Paper.
- Wilson, P. and Reily D. (2007). *Joint Evaluation of CARE, CRS, Save the Children and World Vision Indonesia Responses to the Yogyakarta Earthquake*.
- World Bank. (2010). Indonesia: First step towards post Merapi reconstruction. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/indonesia-first-step-towards-post-merapi-reconstruction>.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AADMER	ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response
AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
AHA Centre	ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Disaster Assistance
APMCDRR	Asia Pacific Ministerial Conference on DRR
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BAKORNAS	National Disaster Management Coordinating Board (Badan Koordinasi Nasional)
BNPB	Disaster Management Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana)
BPBD	Provincial and District Disaster Management Agency (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah)
BRR	Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi)
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CGD	Centre for Global Development
CHS	Core Humanitarian Standard
CSO	civil society organisation
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECB	Emergency Capacity Building
EMS	Emergency Management System
FBO	Faith-Based Organisation
FTS	Financial Tracking System
GHRP	Global Humanitarian Response Plan
GOI	Government of Indonesia
HAG	Humanitarian Advisory Group
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
NDRF	National Disaster Response Framework
NEAR	Network for Empowered Aid Response

NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNGO	national NGO
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PLANAS PRB	National Platform for DRR
Planas PRB, 2009	National Action Plan for DRR 2006–2009
PMI	Indonesia Red Crescent national society (Palang Merah Indonesia)
RC/HC	Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator
SEA	sexual exploitation and abuse
SEJAJAR	Network-of-Networks of Civil Society Organisations (Sekretariat Jaringan-Antar-jaringan OMS-LSM)
TNI	Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia)
UN	United Nations
UNDRR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit

