Repatriation under Parallel Governance: Why Current Rakhine Conditions Make Rohingya Returns Unsafe

MSF research in Cox’s Bazar found 84% of surveyed refugees would not feel safe returning to Myanmar under current conditions. Many also express deep frustration with camp life and dwindling aid, unable to return or integrate locally, while protection and assistance deteriorate. Repatriation is often framed as the ‘solution’ to relieve pressure on host states or reduce aid budgets, rather than to protect rights and agency. As conditions in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char deteriorate, ‘voluntariness’ risks becoming little more than consent under duress. United Nations entities state that conditions in Rakhine are not conducive to return and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has urged Bangladesh to suspend repatriation pilots given these risks.

Despite these warnings, repatriation remains politically attractive shaped by regional politics as much as conditions inside Myanmar and Bangladesh. ASEAN’s consensus-based diplomacy and Charter principle of non-interference limit how directly it can confront accountability and protection conditions in Myanmar, even as it remains the main regional forum. Its Myanmar approach (including the Five-Point Consensus) has delivered little reduction in violence or inclusive political dialogue, weakening confidence that regional diplomacy can secure the protections return requires. Meanwhile, bilateral talks (including those in Bangkok) can revive pressure for return timelines despite ongoing safety risks, underscoring the need for firm guardrails against premature repatriation and stronger regional burden-sharing.

Why Rakhine today is not safe for return

Violence, coercion and impunity remain entrenched. The 2018 UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission documented large-scale killings, sexual violence and village destruction by Myanmar’s security forces. Since the 2021 coup, organisations continue to record killings, arson, forced labour, arbitrary detention and movement controls.

Dispossession and segregation persist. A 2025 UN-backed investigation found that many Rohingya villages destroyed in 2017 were later replaced by military infrastructure. Rohingya remain confined by checkpoints, permits and curfews, with recent reporting warning of forced labour and intensified movement restrictions in northern Rakhine.

Statelessness and structural discrimination endure. Discriminatory citizenship laws leave most Rohingya without legal status, documentation or any enforceable rights. Neither the junta nor the ULA/AA has offered a credible path to citizenship restoration, land restitution or equality. Repatriation risks returning Rohingya back to territory where homes and land have been expropriated with no clear, enforceable remedy.

Humanitarian need is escalating. In Rakhine, conflict, funding cuts and blockades have driven sharp rises in acute malnutrition and hunger, with around two million people facing starvation. Aid delivery is constrained by restrictions imposed by both the junta and the ULA/AA. Large-scale return without structural change and resourcing would worsen scarcity and increase exposure to violence and exploitation.

Intersectional risks in return planning

In the current context, core protections cannot be relied on, and risk is not evenly experienced. Threats vary sharply by identity, family circumstances and the location to which people are returned. HAG’s Reframing Inclusion: Integrating Intersectionality in Humanitarian Response in Myanmar report highlights that access and vulnerability in Myanmar’s crises are shaped by overlapping identities and structural forces. For Rohingya returns, this means ‘safety’ is multi-dimensional: statelessness and segregation intersect with gender, age, disability, documentation and geography, creating distinct protection threats and access barriers. In an already severely underfunded response, community-informed intersectional analysis helps prioritise those facing the most layered exclusion.

Implications for policy and humanitarian practice

Shifting territorial control in Rakhine reshapes return planning: who controls movement and documentation, how risks are verified, and whether independent monitoring is feasible. Fragmented authority and low access must be treated as core constraints.

• Repatriation benchmarks should be grounded in tangible, rights-based indicators. This includes freedom of movement, legal status and documentation, non-discrimination, access to services, and credible protection guarantees, verified through independent monitoring. These should be treated as minimum operating conditions for any return activity, with clear triggers to pause returns if benchmarks are not met or deteriorate (e.g.  renewed movement restrictions, forced relocation, verified patterns of coercion, or obstruction of independent monitoring).
• Clear red lines and operational triggers are needed. Humanitarian organisations and donors should oppose any return plans that send Rohingya to segregated settings or that preserve harsh movement restrictions. Policy debates on return cannot be separated from conditions in Bangladesh: assistance and protection in refugee camps must not be allowed to erode in ways that pressure refugees into unsafe returns. Safeguarding voluntariness requires a baseline of dignity and security in exile.
• Engagement with de facto authorities must not normalise abuse. Agencies may need to work pragmatically with the AA and other local actors to reach communities, but such engagement must not entrench segregation, discrimination or coercive control. Monitoring and accountability must adapt: through community-led protection monitoring and partnerships with local civil society, confidential reporting channels and secure data handling. Local organisations can face retaliation or political pressure for raising protection concerns, so engagement strategies should include risk-sharing and strong duty-of-care safeguards.
• Rohingya-led organisations and local civil society are central to any solution. HAG’s Localisation through Partnership: Shifting Towards Locally-Led Programming in Myanmar reports (see: phase 1, phase 2, phase 3) found that meeting community needs requires a genuine shift in power to local actors including meaningful control over decisions. It also sets out what this can look like in practice: transferring grant-holder responsibilities, investing in local operational systems, and aligning donor expectations around local leadership and mutual accountability. Applied to repatriation, if Rohingya organisations are treated only as implementers rather than decision-makers, participation becomes tokenistic and protection analysis weakens. Rohingya organisations, both inside Myanmar and in exile, should shape return planning from the outset. This is especially important because repatriation is highly politicised: without Rohingya-led oversight, ‘progress’ claims can mask burden-shifting and leave the structures of persecution intact.

There is no shortcut to safe repatriation

Rohingya refugees consistently say they want to return home, but only in safety and with rights. Today’s Rakhine, shaped by violence, segregation, renewed abuses under contested de facto governance and a deepening humanitarian crisis, does not meet that threshold. A credible pathway to return depends on measurable change: restored legal status with a pathway to citizenship; freedom of movement in practice; protection from violence by any actor; and access to livelihoods, services and humanitarian assistance verified through independent monitoring.

A better starting point is to treat Rohingya claims to land, citizenship and protection as non-negotiable, and to align donor and operational decisions accordingly. That means clear red lines against returns to segregated sites or under movement restrictions; sustaining dignity and protection in Bangladesh; and investing in community-led protection monitoring and safe reporting channels that work in low-access areas. Rohingya-led organisations, inside Myanmar and in exile, should be resourced as decision-makers in return planning, not consulted at the margins.

The question is not simply when the Rohingya can go home, but on what kind of home the international community is willing to insist.